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Abstract: We stand at a key juncture: a Western political crisis arose in 2016-17 to match 
the deep economic crisis of the preceding decade. Events and new social movements of 
recent years seem to hail the collapse of the project of liberal democracy, though it is hard to 
see what will replace it. Among the conceptual and analytic tools bequeathed by Marx are 
those necessary to better understand and anticipate the direction of this key historical mo-
ment – from Donald Trump, Brexit and the so-called ‘culture wars’ to the horizon of liberal 
democracy itself. In this reflection, I suggest some ways in which Marx’s early thoughts on 
the liberal state and civil society can and should help us to better understand and explain our 
present predicament. To say that the Young Marx can help us today with what he called ‘the 
ruthless critique of everything existing’ is not to say that he can do so alone. It is precisely the 
issues overlooked or ‘fudged’ by Marx and Marxism – gender, sexuality, and race/racism for 
example – that now sit at the centre of our ‘culture wars’, alongside but never reducible to the 
contradictions and crises of capitalism. I conclude that it is only with the help of other writers 
of the 20th and 21st centuries, from Antonio Gramsci to Frantz Fanon and bell hooks, that 
we can usefully mobilise the Young Marx today, to critique the world as we find it and espe-
cially – the very ‘point’ of theory according to Marx – to change it. 
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“You also had people that were very fine people, on both sides” 
-- President Donald Trump, 2017. 
 
 “Political emancipation was at the same time an emancipation of civil society from 
politics and from even the semblance of a general content” 
-- The ‘Young’ Karl Marx, 1843. 
1. Introduction 
Donald Trump’s response to reporters at a press conference following the murder of 
antifascist demonstrator Heather Heyer at the Charlottesville “Unite the Right” march 
by the neo-Nazi James Alex Fields Jr. was emblematic of the present political crisis. 
The political mainstream responded to Trump’s claim that there were “very fine peo-
ple, on both sides” with outrage. Not only liberal and left wing commentators and poli-
ticians, but also conservative Republicans including House Speaker Paul Ryan, ex-
pressed disgust. The BBC North America correspondent James Cook later suggest-
ed that Trump’s comments gave “succour to the far right”, and approvingly cited Mitt 
Romney’s tweet in response: “No, not the same. One side is racist, bigoted, Nazi. 
The other opposes racism and bigotry. Morally different universes” (Cook 2017). Yet 
a BBC article entitled “America's Extremist Battle: Antifa V Alt-Right”, published just 
six months before Charlottesville, had drawn an identical moral equivalence to that 
mobilised by Trump. There, the BBC described anti-fascists and the neo-fascists styl-
ing themselves “alt-right” as “two groups at the extreme ends of the political spec-
708 Ben Whitham 
CC-BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons License, 2018. 
trum” (Yates 2017). Their use of violence rendered the two groups morally equivalent 
“extremists”, according to this view. So what changed?  
The BBC has been one of many fronts in the so-called ‘culture wars’. Accused of 
peddling “fake news” by the Trump administration early in 2017 (BBC News 2017a), 
of “pro-remain bias” by Brexit supporters (Maddox 2017), and of anti-Corbyn bias by 
the Labour left – the latter at least partly substantiated by the BBC Trust, which found 
that political editor Laura Kuenssberg “broke accuracy and impartiality rules in a 
News at Six report about Jeremy Corbyn” (BBC News 2017b). These are seemingly 
extraordinary accusations for an organisation that prides itself on ‘neutrality’. But Tom 
Mills gets to the heart of the BBC’s ideological ‘neutrality’ in his analysis of structural 
bias against Corbyn: “Corbynism seeks to develop a political movement that can 
transcend neoliberalism. It therefore finds itself at odds with the prevailing culture of 
the contemporary BBC, which in any case has always been orientated towards main-
stream politics” (Mills 2017). Political ‘neutrality’, as any first-year undergraduate stu-
dent of politics should be able to tell you, is an impossibility. At the BBC it really con-
sists of giving equal coverage to dominant forces within the boundaries of main-
stream, status quo party politics. It is of course not alone in this – an LSE study of 
newspapers found that bias against Corbyn was widespread and systematic (Cam-
maerts et al. 2016).  
Traditional media have struggled with the notion that a politician representing a 
project so ‘other’ to the neoliberal norm should be treated with any seriousness at all, 
let alone respect. Similarly, while Trump’s comments made the absurdity of taking a 
‘neutral’ position on the rise of fascism inescapable to even the BBC, their earlier 
coverage of antifa and the alt-right drew a moral equivalence because political vio-
lence (their story had been inspired by the much-publicised punching of neo-Nazi 
Richard Spencer by a masked anti-fascist) situated both movements outside the 
sphere of ‘normal’ politics.  
The political crisis experienced by the West today – with Trump and Brexit its two 
most powerful emblems, but Corbyn, Bernie Sanders, Black Lives Matter, #MeToo 
and myriad other individuals and movements also at stake – is the endgame of ne-
oliberalism and signals the fundamental limits of the liberal democratic state itself. 
The ‘normal’ politics of Western liberal democracies has been on a tapering trajecto-
ry, growing ever narrower; the only qualification for fitting within that normal politics 
being that one represents the (class, race, gender, sexual, cultural) politics of accept-
ing neoliberal norms – what Mark Fisher calls “capitalist realism” (2009). That means 
accepting not only the privatisations and marketisations of public industries, goods 
and spaces, but also certain “moral” prohibitions – on raising income tax on high 
earners or corporation tax on big businesses, both of which are characterised as the 
real “wealth creators” in neoliberal societies (Whitham 2015). 
What the culture wars have so starkly revealed is the horizon of this neoliberal 
politics and of the liberal democratic state. In his essay “On the Jewish Question”, the 
‘Young Marx’ notes how the transition from feudalism and the rise of the bourgeoisie 
to the status of a ruling class effectively created a “political” state predicated on the 
“rights of man”, but in which a depoliticisation is underway through the creation of 
civil society. This emancipation and the political “freedom” the Enlightenment engen-
dered was always inherently limited, and its contradictions were bound eventually to 
be revealed. The bifurcation of our social selves that the liberal democratic state 
model achieves, the internal schism between the self as a member of a political 
community and the self as “private” individual, a member of civil society, results, as 
the Young Marx saw, not in the abolition of religiosity but in its reincarnation. As long 
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as such a split defines our social life, our ability to make meaningful political progress 
is curtailed and our political culture becomes an ever-narrower domain. ‘Normal’ poli-
tics is reduced to choices between policy-tweaks: to questions of how the state can 
better facilitate the relationship between the privatised, atomised citizen-as-consumer 
– the member of civil society – and the market. It is in this political vacuum, this loss 
of meaningful debate over how we could and should live together as societies, that 
our present political crisis was born. In this reflection, I therefore draw upon key texts 
and concepts of the Young Marx to highlight how he anticipated the present crisis. 
But the Young Marx is not enough to explain and especially to change the direction 
of travel of Western (neo)liberal democracies today; and of course the Young Marx 
would have us not only ‘interpret’ the world when “the point is to change it”. The so-
cial movements of resistance which have led us to the present confrontation with the 
liberal democratic state embody anti-racist, anti-colonial, anti-patriarchal, and anti-
heteronormative values in ways that Marx – young or mature – simply could not ac-
count for. Here I reach out to ‘friends’. These friends – Antonio Gramsci, Frantz Fan-
on and bell hooks – are sympathetic to, but not constrained by, Marxist thought. It is, 
in my view, essential to incorporate the reflections of such friends if we are to make 
the most of Marx’s thought today. 
2. The “Culture Wars” and the Present Political Crisis 
Trump’s election has been viewed as both a product and a propagator of “the culture 
wars” (for example: Nagle 2017). These so-called “wars” have consisted partly of a 
revival of left and right wing political cultures that were marginalised or repressed 
during the allegedly post-ideological ‘happy 90s’, and a conflict being played out be-
tween them; largely in the digital spaces of social media and online forums, from 
4chan to Twitter. The association of the so-called ‘alt-right’ with such activity has, 
however, led to confusion. Neo-Nazis across the West have been identified as – and 
many now actively seek identification as – ‘alt-right’. 
The core project of the racist and neo-Nazi groups and individuals styling them-
selves ‘alt-right’ has been one of opposing a wide range of ‘liberal’ and ‘left’ political 
positions, especially feminisms, along with women, and all minority ethnicities, gen-
der identities and sexualities. To the extent that we might wish to recognise the exist-
ence of “culture wars”, they consist in confrontations between these far-right move-
ments, old and new, and the left-wing, feminist, anti-racist and other activists and in-
tellectuals they despise. But an important third party to this transnational conflict has 
been the self-proclaimed ‘centrist’ movement that seeks a return to the failed and 
irretrievable neoliberal norm – the so-called ‘centrist dads’ who continue to appeal to 
the contradictory normative schema of neoliberalism, while denouncing all forms of 
radical politics (left, right, and feminist). This “centrist ancien regime” (Lemmey 2018) 
consists of mostly white, professional, middle/upper-middle class men, often working 
in political journalism or research, who simply cannot accept that their dogma might 
have ceased to determine the horizons of normal politics, since they only ever under-
stood it as a pragmatic approach to ‘reality’, and not as a partisan political project at 
all.  
The culture wars represent a profound crisis of the neoliberal state. The strategies 
and discourses of depoliticisation advocated by neoliberal thinkers like Friedrich 
Hayek and Milton Friedman, and perfected in practice not, as is often assumed, by 
Reagan and Thatcher, but through the ‘Third Way’ politics of Clinton and Blair, have 
begun to reach their logical conclusion. Through the transformation of formal politics 
in Western liberal democracies by prevailing ideas of ‘pragmatism’, ‘public manage-
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ment’, ‘evidence-based policy’ and so on, the Third Wayers sought to render the 
state, as Friedman once demanded, little more than “an umpire to interpret and en-
force the rules” of the “game” of capitalism (Friedman 2002, 15): the interactions be-
tween citizens-as-consumers and the various markets providing them with goods and 
services (including formerly ‘public’ services). Increasingly, those seeking to use the 
state as a forum for actual political debate – debate about how we should live togeth-
er as societies – were accused of ‘ideology’, of ‘playing politics’ with what are funda-
mentally economic, scientifically law-governed concerns (from basic human behav-
iour to the most appropriate, just or efficient way to spend tax revenues on public 
goods). 
Of course, we were already in the grip of a crisis when Brexit, Trump and the cul-
ture wars arrived. The financial crash of 2007 had precipitated the widest and deep-
est international economic crisis since the 1930s. The Neoliberal Crisis (Davison and 
Harris 2015), a short collection of essays by the editors of the journal Soundings, 
originally published between 2009 and 2011, was extremely prescient with regard to 
the present political crisis (Whitham 2017). Contributor Doreen Massey noted that the 
economic crisis in the UK had yet to be matched by a “real crisis in the ideological 
formation” (Davison and Harris 2015, 182), while Stuart Hall and others highlighted 
the inescapably racialised and postcolonial aspects of neoliberalism, which exists 
“cheek by jowl with older conservative attachments to nation, racial homogeneity, 
Empire, tradition” (Ibid., 22). Michael Rustin, in an eerie foreshadowing of Trump’s 
successful White House run, argued that while Obama’s election (then in his first 
term as President) was heartening, representing “a source of hope”, the Democrat 
continuation of the neoliberal project in office could prove so alienating as to ultimate-
ly “bring to office a president with a political outlook like that of Sarah Palin” (Ibid., 
35). Through their Gramscian analysis of the crisis as a “conjuncture”, these authors 
were able to foresee the Western political crisis that began to come to fruition in 
2016. Decades of de-politicisation in the name of ‘centrism’, combined with deep 
austerity cuts dressed-up as inevitable and rational policy-making or as a ‘belt tight-
ening’ moral obligation on ordinary people to absorb the costs created by irresponsi-
ble bankers, brought us to a point where ideological struggle – declared “dead” by 
Blair and others – finds its eternal return. The culture wars are a new left-right poli-
tics, played out across a range of old and new political fora (social and traditional 
media, campus speaking tours, and increasingly among politicians of the mainstream 
too). 
So neoliberal depoliticisation in the name of ‘free’ market-governed sociality, 
along with neoliberal multiculturalism, which everywhere proclaims racial equality as 
its goal (Friedman was convinced that racism was a product of politics and could be 
eradicated by the cleansing purity of market mechanisms) while continuing colonial 
trajectories in practice, created the conditions for the present crisis. But its roots can 
be traced much further back. The Young Marx identified, at the very point of its birth, 
the horizon of what would become the neoliberal state. 
3. The Young Marx: Limits and Contradictions of the Liberal Democratic State 
It bears mentioning that the notion of a ‘Young Marx’ is, like most aspects of Marxist 
thought, a contested concept within the Marxist tradition itself. Louis Althusser was 
strongly opposed to what he saw as a “liberal” trend, instigated by “petty bourgeois” 
critics of Marxism and then taken up en masse by “Communist intellectuals” them-
selves, of developing “humanist” readings of Marx by appealing to his early works 
(Althusser 1969, 10-11). The Young Marx, from Althusser’s perspective, “was merely 
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applying the theory of alienation, that is, Feuerbach's theory of ‘human nature’, to 
politics and the concrete activity of man, before extending it (in large part) to political 
economy” (Ibid., 46). Essentially, the Althusserian objection is that the Young Marx 
was in fact not a Marxist, but a Feuerbachian humanist and ethicist. While Marxists 
like Althusser are right to be sceptical of humanist revisionism, they are constrained 
by a powerful commitment to its discredited opposite: scientism. It is quite possible to 
(critically) embrace and draw upon Marxism without either adhering to the notion that 
it is about generating “scientific knowledge […] of history” (Ibid., 14) or abandoning 
the insights of Capital altogether in favour of a ‘human nature’-centred account of 
alienation. Marx – and especially the Young Marx – was first and foremost concerned 
with Kritik; the critique of existing social “formations”, as Althusser calls them. Those 
of us who seek to continue this practical-intellectual tradition should feel free enough 
to choose to apply those insights from Marx himself that are most appropriate to the 
specific social formation(s) we are critiquing (and indeed to splice other ideas into 
these insights as I do later in this paper). It is my – I hope uncontroversial – conten-
tion that to critically explain the contemporary political crisis and its “culture wars”, the 
Young Marx on the origins and limits of the liberal democratic state is more useful 
than the mature Marx on, say, the fetishism of the commodity or the tendency of the 
rate of profit to fall. 
“Bourgeois” revolutions like that which brought about American independence 
consisted, for the Young Marx, in a form of “political emancipation” that is “not the 
final and absolute form of human emancipation” (Marx 1978b/1843, 32). Such revolu-
tions may have marked the decisive end of the divine right of kings and the shaking 
off of the last vestiges of feudal relations, but this transformation was also a funda-
mental ideological transformation of what was to be considered political. As Marx 
puts it in his essay “On the Jewish Question”:  
The state abolishes, after its fashion, the distinctions established by birth, so-
cial rank, education, occupation, when it decrees that birth, social rank, educa-
tion, occupation are non-political distinctions; when it proclaims, without regard 
to these distinctions, that every member of society is an equal partner in popu-
lar sovereignty (Ibid., 33).   
The ‘political state’, the birth of which the Young Marx was focused on, culminated in 
the contemporary (neo)liberal democracy. Western liberal democracies are societies 
in which state power is exercised in the name of equality (‘equality before the law’, 
‘equal rights’ and so on) but in the actual material service of inequality (the exploita-
tion and cultural demonisation of working-class people, people of minority ethnic 
backgrounds, and of women). “Liberty” in liberal states conceived as “the right to do 
everything which does not harm others”, is, the Young Marx argues, “not founded 
upon the relations between man and man, but rather upon the separation of man 
from man. It is the right of such separation. The right of the circumscribed individual, 
withdrawn into himself” (Ibid., 42). The central contradiction to which the Young Marx 
pointed is thus a state of affairs wherein people, freed from the social bonds of feu-
dalism and rendered political actors through the emergence of ‘civil society’ are sim-
ultaneously barred from engaging in any meaningful politics since the end state of 
human emancipation is assumed to already be achieved, and “the political character 
of civil society” is in fact “abolished” (Ibid., 45), its constituents reduced to “man re-
garded as an isolated monad” (Ibid., 42). When he writes that the transition from feu-
dalism to truly capitalist societies involved the “emancipation of civil society from poli-
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tics” (Marx 1978b/1843, 45), the Young Marx’s point is that the ostensible politicisa-
tion of society in the creation of the liberal democratic state in fact contains within it a 
de-politicisation.  
This dialectical reading of the Young Marx, wherein the liberal democratic state 
formation contains the seed of its own destruction, allows us to look further back, well 
beyond the dawn of the present crisis, or even the neoliberal acceleration of de-
politicisation, and to see the de-politicising tendency in the very form of the liberal 
states created by the bourgeois revolutions.  
Politics as expressed in civil society are, in the Young Marx’s view, effectively a 
simulation predicated on abstraction and alienation. This is nowhere truer than in ne-
oliberal societies after what Francis Fukuyama (in)famously called the “End of Histo-
ry”. The political, in these societies, is circumscribed to an ever-narrowing range of 
positions, since the economic base of such societies is not up for debate. Not only 
the “political economists” targeted by the Young Marx in the Manuscripts, but also all 
mainstream politicians and viable political parties, adopted the position that “every 
individual is a totality of needs and only exists for the other person, as the other ex-
ists for him, in so far as each becomes a means for the other” (Marx 1978c/1844, 
101). This is precisely the worldview informing the depoliticising neoliberal politics 
that brought us to the present crisis. We can think of the ‘Third Way’ politics and ‘new 
public management’ of the late twentieth century, indeed of the neoliberal turn, as the 
end point of the liberal democratic state.  
4. Friends of the Young Marx 
The Young Marx wrote, in a letter later known as “For a Ruthless Criticism of Every-
thing Existing”:  
Apart from the general anarchy which has erupted among the reformers, each 
is compelled to confess to himself that he has no clear conception of what the 
future should be. That, however, is just the advantage of the new trend: that 
we do not attempt dogmatically to prefigure the future, but want to find the new 
world only through criticism of the old (Marx 1978a/1843, 13). 
This spirit of radical openness, in striking contrast to the historical scientism and de-
terminism that would become characteristic of much Marxist thought, is especially 
useful for thinking about how we can engage the Young Marx today. “Criticism of the 
old” world today necessarily includes criticism of Marx and Marxism. Both have suf-
fered from blind spots, especially on the intersectional but irreducible character of 
social formations of domination, inequality and exploitation. Feminists especially, but 
also many anti-racist and post-colonial scholars, have persistently pointed to the fail-
ure of Marx and Engels to treat issues of gendered and racial inequality and domina-
tion as anything more than epiphenomenal of economic modes of production. This 
economistic reductionism is inadequate to grasp our present situation. And it is for 
this reason that I now want to enlist some ‘friends’ of Marx to shed further light on the 
crisis and its direction. 
The friends of Marx I refer to here – Gramsci, Fanon and hooks – constitute by no 
means an exhaustive or representative sample. To list sympathisers with and devel-
opers of Marx(ism) in the fields of these three authors alone – critical social theory, 
anti/post-colonial and psychoanalytic theory, and intersectional feminism – would be 
a massive endeavour. Instead I have chosen three authors who I feel speak espe-
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cially to the spirit of the Young Marx, and whose insights can be made to speak to 
the present crisis.  
Antonio Gramsci’s contribution to Marxist thought has been elaborated in great 
detail by many authors, over many years. But for understanding the culture wars and 
the direction of the present crisis, there are a few crucial points it is worth briefly un-
packing here. In his refutation of the “economistic superstition” (Gramsci 1999/1916-
1935, 215) inherent to popular early 20th-century interpretations of Marxism, Gramsci 
insists that: “It is therefore necessary to combat economism […] especially in the 
theory and practice of politics. In this field the struggle can and must be carried on by 
developing the concept of hegemony” (Ibid., 216). Like the Young Marx, Gramsci is 
concerned with the “distinction between political society and civil society, which is 
made into and presented as an organic one” by liberalism (Ibid., 210) but he sees a 
similar fallacy being committed by the economistic Marxists of the Second Interna-
tional. Gramsci asks us to recall that for Marx, the struggle that should result in class 
consciousness must take place “on the terrain of ideologies” (Ibid., 213). The neolib-
eral hegemony that the “centrist ancien regime” mentioned above seeks to protect or 
restore through their role in the culture wars consists of a set of “common sense” dis-
courses about politics and economy since, in a “discursive sense, there is a struggle 
for hegemony, which is played out on the terrain of common sense” (Donoghue 
2017, 9).  
But the contradictions of Western liberal-democracy run deeper than capitalism. 
In his classic The Wretched of the Earth, the Algerian revolutionary and psychoana-
lytic theorist and practitioner Frantz Fanon writes: 
The violence with which the supremacy of white values is affirmed and the ag-
gressiveness which has permeated the victory of these values over the ways 
of life and of thought of the native mean that, in revenge, the native laughs in 
mockery when Western values are mentioned in front of him (Fanon 
1967/1961, 33). 
In postcolonial Western societies, as in the colonised societies Fanon sought to un-
derstand and emancipate, the structures and privileges of ‘civil society’ have never 
been universal; they are not extended to the black and the brown, to the colonial and 
postcolonial subjects. The left, Paul Gilroy notes in his introduction to Fanon’s other 
key work, Black Skin, White Masks (2017/1952) “despaired at Fanon’s deviations” 
from Marxist orthodoxy, finding “its own economistic logic disputed by his deeper 
sense of the sociogenesis of racial inequality” (Ibid., xvii). Marx, it must be recog-
nised, was as much a product of the “European culture” that Fanon understood to 
function “as a means of stripping himself [Fanon] of his race” (Ibid., 192) as any other 
Western intellectual of the 19th century. Crucially, unlike Marx, Fanon’s enquiries into 
the (post/anti) colonial led him to find that “scientific objectivity was barred to me, for 
the alienated, the neurotic, was my brother, my sister, my father” (Ibid., 193). And so 
Fanon’s work was essentially a form of what is sometimes called ‘standpoint theory’ 
today. In other words, Marx – as a Great White Man of European intellectual history – 
may not provide us with all the tools we need to understand the experiences of those 
subjugated by social relations of structured inequality other than the bourgeois-
proletarian one. 
So, to account for the present crisis – indeed the whole trajectory of Western his-
tory – through Marx alone would be insufficient. At the heart of the crisis and espe-
cially the culture wars that brought Donald Trump to power are postcolonial issues: 
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Police shootings of unarmed black men in the United States and the emergence of 
Black Lives Matter as a transnational social movement, the ‘#RhodesMustFall 
movement on campuses from South Africa to the UK, the systematic demonisation 
and harassment of Muslims in the West as part of the so-called “War on Terror”, the 
attempted removal of statues of the slave-owner and Confederate General Robert E. 
Lee that triggered the Charlottesville neo-Nazi demonstrations and antifascist coun-
ter-demonstrations. Neither the Young Marx’s critique of the liberal state nor the ma-
ture Marx’s critique of capitalism is sufficient for a critical engagement with all of this. 
In many of her works, the feminist theorist, pedagogical innovator and cultural crit-
ic bell hooks uses the helpful term “white supremacist capitalist patriarchy” when re-
ferring to American (and, we can infer, more broadly “Western”) society (hooks 1982; 
2000/1984; 1994)1. Though something of a mouthful, this label is useful because it 
pinpoints with laser-sharp accuracy three of the core intersecting structural logics that 
underpin the Western liberal-democratic social model. By continuously referring to 
white supremacist capitalist patriarchy across her works, despite how cumbersome 
the phrase is, hooks also brilliantly emphasises the fundamental contradictions and 
hypocrisies at the heart of more common, euphemistic labels for such societies, in-
cluding ‘liberal democracies’.  
Apart from the concept of white supremacist capitalist patriarchy, hooks trans-
cends both Marx and the other ‘friends’ I have alluded to in a further crucial sense. 
Devoid of both the macho posturing and the scientism that has afflicted so much writ-
ing by the “Great White Men” of social theory – Marx and Gramsci included – hooks 
is able to speak seriously of the importance of love and community in social move-
ments and society at large (hooks 1994, 263). The cultural trajectory of Enlighten-
ment Man that underpinned the writings of the young and especially the mature Marx 
is shared with the ‘centrist dads’ and anti-feminist social media trolls of the culture 
wars (i.e. the mostly middle-aged, mostly white men who use social media as a plat-
form to seek to publicly discipline women’s knowledge through appeals to ‘science’ 
and facticity), a good number of whom identify as left-wing. Uncompromising and in-
tellectually brilliant, hooks nevertheless consciously strives to render her work acces-
sible (Ibid., 8) and meaningful to people outside of academia, especially women of 
colour like herself. While hooks has been accused by some (including White Femi-
nists) of being “merciless” (hooks 2000/1984, xiii), she writes with care and love as 
much as anger. This extends to hooks’ pedagogical theory too – teaching, for hooks, 
is about creating space for all voices in the classroom, creating conversations and 
dialogue in place of lectures and the one-way “banking” model of education. I men-
tion this because hooks’ work – both her social and her pedagogical theories and 
analyses – provides clues to the way forward, to the politics that must come after the 
culture wars, after capitalism. What the left should surely be struggling for in the cul-
ture wars is a politics of love, a politics that recognises the intersectionality of ine-
qualities and domination, rather than re-inscribing those very inequalities in leftist 
form by marginalising feminist, anti-racist and transgender recognition struggles in 
favour of economistic reductionism. 
                                            
1 hooks initially coined the term “white capitalist patriarchy” (a modification of Zillah Eisen-
stein’s socialist feminist term “capitalist patriarchy”) in her debut book Ain’t I a Woman? 
(hooks 1982) but later added the “supremacist” in Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center 
(1984/2000). In some of her later work, when stressing the international dimensions of 
Western regimes, hooks opts for “imperialist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy”. I pre-
fer not to add the “imperialist” since this dimension can arguably be adequately captured by 
both “white supremacist” and “capitalist”. 
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5. Conclusion 
This reflection on how the Young Marx can help us to think about the present political 
crisis and its so-called “culture wars” is intended to provoke as much as to pay trib-
ute. That 200 years since his birth, this figure can still be rendered pertinent, vital 
even, to our theorisations, critiques and analyses of crises as if we are “haunted by 
Marx’s ghost still rattling around in the theoretical machine” (Hall 1986, 32), speaks to 
the power of his ideas and the eloquence of his writing. But to imagine that our pre-
sent political crisis could be accounted for with a close reading of Capital would be a 
mistake. Patriarchy, misogyny, heteronormativity, racism, and Islamophobia – the 
structures and ideologies underpinning liberal democracies viz. white supremacist 
capitalist patriarchies – have other sources than modes of production, and fulfil other 
social functions than bourgeois exploitation of the proletariat. 
What I have sought to show is both what the Young Marx can offer us today and 
the conditionality we ought to impose upon this offer. We can only usefully deploy 
Marx to understand our present political crisis if we do so in conjunction with ‘friends’ 
like those I discuss above. From Antonio Gramsci to bell hooks, we need to bring 
more voices to bear on our problem, to better understand the dynamics and debates 
among emergent and ascendant social movements. This theoretical and analytic 
heterogeneity is essential if we want not only to interpret the world but also to change 
it. 
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